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United States v. Noriega as a Reason for
an International Criminal Court
I. Introduction
On June 8, 1990, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida declared with finality that the United
States had jurisdiction over General Manuel Antonio Noriega.1 This
decision followed a series of court battles beginning with the indict-
ment issued against Noriega. However, the district court's decision
of jurisdiction was subsequently challenged by Noriega on the
grounds that the government's taping and the Cable News Net-
work's (CNN) subsequent airing of telephone calls including attor-
ney/client conversations violated his right to a fair trial.' Noriega's
motion to dismiss was denied because he failed to prove any injury
or any reasonable expectation of confidentiality."
Noriega's seven month trial began on September 16, 1991, and
ended on April 9, 1992, with a jury verdict of guilty on eight of ten
indictments.5 Noriega faced a maximum of 120 years in prison.6 On
1. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990). This same decision
also declared proper jurisdiction over Lieutenant Colonel Luis Del Cid. Noriega was the leader
of Panamanian armed forces and Del Cid was his secretary. Id. at 1510.
2. United States v. Noriega, 683 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (granting Noriega's
motion for special appearance of counsel). The indictment, alleging Noriega "was part of an
international conspiracy to import cocaine and materials used in producing cocaine into the
United States," was issued in the Southern District of Florida on February 4, 1988. Id.
Through special appearance of counsel, Noriega was allowed to challenge the indictment, id.,
but the challenge failed. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1510.
3. The court battle over tapes aired by Cable News Network (CNN) began on Novem-
ber 8, 1990, United States v. Noriega, 752 F.Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990), and ended with a
denial of Noriega's motion to dismiss on May 3, 1991, United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp.
1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
4. United States v. Noriega, 764 F.Supp. at 1489, 1492.
5. Larry Rohter, The Noriega Verdict; U.S. Jury Convicts Noriega of Drug Trafficking
Role as the Leader of Panama, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 10, 1992, at Al. The counts on which
Noriega was found guilty are as follows:
a. Count One: Violation of the Racketeer, Influence, Corrupt Organizations Act. This
charge defined a 16 member criminal enterprise led by Noriega which was found to have
conspired to protect and engage in cocaine processing, smuggling and money laundering from
1981 to 1986. The Racketeer, Influence, Corrupt Organizations Act carries a maximum 20
year sentence.
b. Count Two: Violation of the Racketeer, Influence, Corrupt Organizations Act. Noriega
was found to have actually committed those crimes he conspired to commit in Count One.
Again, this carries a maximum 20 year sentence.
c. Count Three: Conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine. This carries a maximum 15
year sentence.
d. Count Four: Distributing 400 kilos of cocaine destined for Florida in May of 1988.
This, too, carries a maximum 15 year sentence.
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July 10, 1992, Noriega was sentenced to forty years," with parole
eligibility in ten years.' Noriega's attorneys irgued to have him
placed in the custody of the Department of Defense rather than serv-
ing his sentence in the federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois.9 The
court determined Noriega was a prisoner of war under the Geneva
Convention, but could be sent to a federal prison as long as the Con-
vention was met. 10 Noriega's attorneys plan to file an appeal in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta,
Georgia."
e. Count Five: Distributing 400 kilos of cocaine destined for Florida in January of 1984.
This carries a maximum 15 year sentence.
f. Count Six: Manufacture of multi-ton quantities of cocaine at a cartel laboratory in
Colombia in 1983 and 1984. This carries a maximum 15 year sentence.
g. Count Seven: Conspiracy to manufacture, import and distribute cocaine from a labora-
tory in Panama. This carries a maximum 15 year sentence.
h. Count Ten: Violation of the Travel Act for traveling or causing others to travel to carry
out an unlawful activity involving cocaine. This carries a maximum five year sentence.
Noriega was found not guilty of the following two counts:
a. Count Eight: Conspiracy to import and distribute 322 kilos of cocaine into the United
States in 1985. This carries a maximum 20 year sentence.
b. Count Nine: Distributing 322 kilos in 1985. This, too, carries a maximum 20 year
sentence. Cable News Network, Inc.: Noriega Verdict Details (CNN television broadcast, Apr.
9, 1992).
6. Noriega Sentenced to 40 Years in Prison; Former General Assails Bush, STAR
TRIB., Jul. 11, 1992, at Al.
7. Id. Noriega received maximum twenty year terms on each of the two racketeering
counts. Noriega Verdict Details (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 9, 1992). These will be
served concurrently. Id.,Noriega also received 15 year sentences on each of the five drug
counts which will run concurrently after the racketeering sentence. Id. He received an addi-
tional five year sentence on the money laundering count. Id. Noriega also received a $100.00
fine and three years special probation upon any subsequent release. Larry Rohter, Noriega
Sentenced to 40 Years in Jail on Drug Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 11, 1992, § 1, at 1.
8. Joane Kenan, Noriega Now Struggles to Stay Out of Modern-Day Alcatraz,
REUTERS, Jul. 11, 1992, available in LExts, Nexis Library, Omni File. Although federal sen-
tencing guidelines would allow Noriega to be eligible for parole in ten years, his attorneys
believe a minimum of twenty-five years is more likely. Because Noriega is currently fifty-eight
years old, his attorneys fear Noriega will die in prison before parole is granted. Id.
9. Id. The federal penitentiary in Marion is considered the modern day Alcatraz. It
imprisons approximately 350 criminals who live virtually in solitary confinement for twenty-
three hours each day. The prisoners are allowed to shower only twice a week, and then only if
they are in manacles. Some prisoners live in an underground unit in isolation. Id.
10. United States v. Noriega, 808 F.Supp. 791, 801 (1992). See also, Jane Sutton,
Noriega Declared Prisoner of War, UPI, Dec. 8, 1992 available in, LEXis, Nexis Library, UPI
File. The Geneva Convention requires humane treatment such as food, exercise, daylight and
fresh air. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Conven-
tion III), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. As of the writing of this comment,
there had been no resolution of Noriega's ultimate detainment destination.
11. Jane Sutton, Noriega Sentenced to 40 Years in Prison, UPI, Jul. 10, 1992, available
in, LExis, Nexis Library, UPI File. Noriega's attorneys feel the appeal process will take at
least four years since an appeal to the United States Supreme Court appears imminent. Id.
Among the legal issues remaining for an appeal are: (I) the battle over CNN's broadcast of
attorney-client conversations, which District Court Judge Hoeveler says is the most important
issue arising from the trial, see infra, note 113 and accompanying text; see also, Noriega's
Sentencing Won't Douse Legal, Political Wrangling in His Case, ATLANTA CONST., Jul. 12,
1992, at A5, (2) Noriega's prisoner of war status, see infra, note 65 and accompanying text,
(3) an outstanding drug indictment facing Noriega in Tampa, Florida for marijuana traffick-
ing, (4) Noriega's charge that he was seized illegally during an illegal invasion of Panama, see
Rohter, supra note 5, (5) the claim to head of state immunity, see infra, notes 49-52 and
UNITED STATES V. NORIEGA
This Comment will include a brief overview of the incidents
leading up to the district court's decision of jurisdiction over
Noriega. It will then focus on the decision to grant jurisdiction, in-
cluding things which the court may have overlooked. This Comment
will then examine the effect the airing of the taped attorney/client
telephone conversations on national television may have had on
Noriega's ability to receive a fair trial. This Comment will conclude
with a discussion of the court's inherent problems with handling the
Noriega case and the resultant need for an international criminal
court.
II. Background
On February 14, 1988 a federal grand jury sitting in the South-
ern District of Florida issued an indictment against Manuel Noriega
for participating in an international conspiracy to smuggle cocaine
and materials used to produce cocaine into and out of the United
States.' 2 The United States government believed Noriega was pro-
tecting the Medellin Cartel and, in return, had received 4.6 million
dollars in payoffs."3 The Medellin Cartel is run predominantly by the
drug lords of Columbia who produce their cocaine from coca grown
in the Medellin Valley. 4 In April of 1988, special appearance of
counsel was allowed to challenge the sufficiency of the indictment;
however, the indictment was upheld.' 5
On December 15, 1989, Noriega officially denounced the United
States to the Panamanian people and declared Panama was in a
"state of war" with the United States. 6 After Panamanian troops
killed an American soldier, the United States ordered its troops to be
on alert.1 7 On December 20, 1989, only five days after Noriega's
declaration of war, President Bush ordered troops into combat in
Panama City to effectuate four goals. 18 The four stated goals of the
accompanying text, see also MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Guilty (PBS television broadcast,
Apr. 9, 1992), and (6) the barring of Noriega's evidence offered to show his help with United
States Central Intelligence Agency for national security reasons, see Cable News Network.
Inc.: U.S. Attorneys Who Tried Noriega Case Discuss Verdict, (CNN television broadcast,
Apr. 9, 1992).
12. United States v. Noriega, 683 F.Supp. 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
13. Richard Cole, Judge Lifts Ban on CNN Use of Noriega Tape Recordings, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 28, 1990, at 1.
14. Robert Harvey, How Can We Halt the Drug Traffic?, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Aug. 31,
1989, at 14. The drug cartel declared "total and absolute war" on the sovereign government
located in Bogota. Id. A presidential candidate was assassinated; an entire judiciary was "'ter-
rorized by the murder of more than 150 judges"; and, approximately 9,000 people died in
drug-related killings. Id. The cartel even offered to pay off the country's 10 billion dollar debt
in exchange.for amnesty, but the offer was not accepted. Id.
15. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1510 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
16. Id. at 1511.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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mission were to "1) safeguard American lives, 2) restore democracy,
3) preserve the Panama Canal treaties, 19 and 4) seize General
Noriega to face federal drug charges in the United States".20
When Noriega learned of the intentions of the United States, he
took sanctuary in the Papal Nunciature.21 After American troops
had been stationed outside the Papal Nunciature for approximately
one week, they began to play loud music continuously for three
days. 22 After the eleventh day of occupying the Nunciature, Noriega
surrendered and was flown to Florida.23
Noriega was placed in the Metropolitan Correctional Center in
Dade County, Florida. While in the facility, Noriega's calls were
monitored. 2' The government subpoenaed the audio tapes,25 and
some of these tapes were leaked to Cable News Network (CNN) by
an undisclosed source.26 Noriega's attorney, Frank A. Rubino, filed
an emergency motion for an injunction to prohibit CNN from airing
the tapes .2  A prior restraint was issued by the district court with an
order that CNN give the tapes to the court for it to hear and to
decide upon the potential harm.28 CNN violated the prior restraint
order by airing the tapes and by refusing to give the court the
tapes.2 9 On emergency appeals by CNN, the prior restraint was up-
held by both the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States. 0
19. Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Pan., 93 Stat. 452; Treaty Con-
cerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-
Pan., 93 Stat. 452 (1979).
20. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1511.
21. id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1991)(motion to dis-
miss based on interception of telephone calls denied). See infra, notes 105-108 and accompa-
nying text.
25. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1483. The government subpoenaed the
tape recorded conversations for hearings to be held between February 15, 1990, and August
18, 1990, when in fact no hearings were scheduled. Id. When the government was in receipt of
the first set of twenty-one tapes, they had the tapes "screened first by an outside Spanish-
speaking DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] agent unconnected with the case to ensure that no
attorney-client conversations were on the tapes." Id. The second group of seventy-one tapes
were not screened by the outside agent, although they may have been screened by an official at
the prison. Id. The last batch of seventy tapes was not reviewed at all because the prior
batches had revealed nothing. Id. at 1484. Out of 162 tapes subpoenaed, only 52 tapes were
actually examined. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1484.
26. Id.
27. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (broadcasting of
CNN tapes enjoined at district court level).
28. Id. at 1035.
29. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1990)(motion to en-
join CNN from broadcasting tapes denied).
30. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (lth Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals admonished CNN for their intentional violation of the district court's order
while asking the appellate court for assistance. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, -
U.S. - 111 S. Ct. 451 (1990). The dissenters of the Supreme Court of the United States
UNITED STATES V. NORIEGA
After being forced to comply, CNN surrendered the tapes to
the district court. After the district court listened to the tapes, it
found CNN could air the tapes in their entirety because they were
harmless. The tapes were declared harmless because, inter alia,
much of what was contained on the tape was spoken in coded lan-
guage.3 1 Because of the negative publicity which Noriega received
prior to the tapes' release, many people believed that anything nega-
tive on the tapes could not mar him any further.32 However, the
tapes being aired and the conversations being reported in newspapers
resulted in many potentially harmful speculations as to what the
coded language meant.3 3
III. Jurisdiction Over Manuel Noriega
A. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Noriega challenged the United States on the issue of jurisdic-
tion on multiple grounds. He first asserted none of his activities oc-
curred within the United States.3 This challenge specifically ad-
dressed the issue of whether the United States could exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction. In order to decide this aspect, it is neces-
sary to look to traditional principles of international law and whether
the statutes charged as violated were meant to have an extraterrito-
rial effect.3.5
Traditionally in international law, if criminal acts committed
outside the United States have an effect inside the country, then it is
permissible to prosecute those acts.3 6 There is no requirement that
any overt act occur within the United States borders as long as there
is an intent to produce effects within the United States." Noriega
were vehemently opposed to upholding this prior restraint. See, Cable News Network, Inc. v.
Noriega, - U.S. __, 111 S. Ct. 451 (1990).
31. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. at 1053.
32. Kevin J. O'Brien, Can Noriega Receive a Fair Trial?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 17, 1990, at 1.
33. See, e.g., M.J. Auckerman and Jeanne DeQuine, Noriega Tapes: Reading Between
the Lines, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1990, at 3A.
34. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1512 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
35. Id.
36. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911) (holding state had the right to prosecute
defendant even though defendant was not in the state until after fraud was completed). There
is a theory that the effect inside the United States must be more than a remote repercussion,
See generally, Jennings, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the United States Antitrust Laws,
33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 146 (1957), but that would seem to be met in this case since Noriega's
crime included importing more than 2,000 pounds of cocaine into the United States. Narcot-
ics, in and of themselves, give a strong justification for prosecution. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 403; United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161 (3rd
Cir. 1986) (showing Congress' intent to allow applicable statutes to have extraterritorial effect
if there were effects within the United States, as where narcotics were found aboard a Pana-
manian ship 200 miles off the coast of New Jersey); Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,
-Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 204; Protocol Amending the Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, Mar. 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, U.N. Doc. E/CONF 63/9.
37. United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161 (3rd Cir. 1986).
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did not attempt to show no overt acts occurred within the United
States, because co-conspirators of Noriega committed overt acts
within the United States borders; under the co-conspirator rule,
Noriega is considered to have committed those acts within the
United States."
The district court found the statutes Noriega was charged to
have violated were intended to apply extraterritorially.3 9 Some of the
statutes specifically state importation of drugs into the United States
is illegal.4 The district court found this language clearly showed an
intent to apply the statutes extraterritorially.' 1 The court's reasoning
may be flawed since importation would not occur until the item
crossed the United States border, thereby making the illegal act ter-
ritorial. If the statute contains nothing specific to lead to the applica-
tion of extraterritorial application, a presumption against it exists.42
This presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction existed for
other statutes being applied in this case, but the presumption was
overcome by the individual circumstances of each statute.
Statutes are to be given extraterritorial effect where extraterri-
torial effect can be inferred from the nature of the offenses and con-
gressional intent. 3 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO) statutes" were found to have extraterritorial
application because the statutes used the words "any person" and
because Congress explicitly called for liberal construction of the
statutes. 5
The Travel Act 4  was charged as violated, and the court found
the Act had extraterritorial application. This finding may have been
an error because the act was passed to allow local officials to go be-
yond state borders, not national borders, in order to catch
criminals.47 Further, the United States Supreme Court has con-
38. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1513-14 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
39. Id. at 1515.
40. E.g., Drug Abuse Protection Act, 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1984); 21 U.S.C. § 959(c)
(1986).
41. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1515.
42. United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1137 (1985) (granting U.S. jurisdiction over defendant charged with, inter alia, attempt-
ing to murder two DEA agents in Columbia).
43. United States v. Baker, 609 F.2d 134, 136 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that prosecution
for intent to distribute marijuana was valid because although the boat was well beyond the
three mile territorial jurisdiction of the United States, it was still within the twelve miles of
custom waters).
44. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 (RICO), Pub. L. 91-
452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C.
§9 1962 (c) and (d) (1988).
45. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452 §
904(a), 84 Stat. 947 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
46. Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1983).
47. United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969) (holding individuals charged with
extortion were validly tried under a statute meant to stop extortion in interstate activities of
[Vol. 11:2
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firmed the Travel Act should not be read broadly."' Therefore, this
extension by the district court from state to national borders may
have been unwarranted.
B. Head of State Immunity
Noriega next claimed head of state immunity. This claim was
denied by the district court because Noriega was not a member of
the executive branch of Panama as defined by the Panamanian Con-
stitution. The Panamanian Constitution defines the executive branch
as the President and the Ministers of the State.49 The United States
had never recognized Noriega as President, but as the leader of Pan-
ama's military. Nonetheless, the district court often referred to
Noriega as the de facto leader of Panama." Therefore, although the
United States had issued an executive decision recognizing Eric
Delvalle as the President of Panama, it may have been an unrealistic
and hypertechnical delineation as the United States the only country
that recognized Delvalle as President. 1 Noriega did not qualify for
head of state immunity under the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons In-
cluding Diplomatic Agents because the Convention refers back to
the constitution of the individual's country of origin for the definition
of head of state.5 1
C. Act of State Immunity
Noriega next pressed the claim of act of state immunity which
was readily dismissed by the district court. Whereas head of state
immunity is a question of the jurisdiction of the court, the act of
state doctrine concerns the courts' inability to decide certain issues.5
Although the act of state doctrine extends beyond heads of state to
protect state officials, 5' the act of the state official must be a public
organized crime where the events took place between New Jersey and Pennsylvania).
48. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) (reversing appellate court's holding
that gambling establishment in Florida was liable under Travel Act where Georgia residents
were crossing border into Florida to gamble).
49. REP. OF PAN. CONST. title VI, art. 136.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 683 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
51. Abraham F. Lowenthal, In Central America, an Unhappy Legacy Bush Can Begin
to Undo, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 1989, at 3.
52. Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons In-
cluding Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, U.N. Gen. Ass. Resn. 3166
(XXVIII). The Convention defines a head of state by directing the reader back to the constitu-
tion of that country. Id. at art. l(a). Noriega decidedly does not fit within the head of state
category under the Panamanian Constitution. REP. OF PAN. CONST. title VI, art. 136.
53. Charles E. Hickey, Note, The Dictator, Drugs and Diplomacy by Indictment:.Head-
of-State Immunity in United States v. Noriega, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 729, 740 (1989).
54. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (holding acts of revolutionary'govern-
ment which became the accepted government were acts of government not adjudicable by
courts of another jurisdiction).
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act in order to be protected. 55 Foreign relations can be hindered
when a court questions the acts of foreign states. 56 Such difficulties
arise when the court's decision is contrary to the view of the execu-
tive of the country in which the court sits.5 .7 Ultimately, it is a judi-
cial question.5" A definite need for separation of powers exists in this
area, and a court must be careful not to go beyond its permissible
scope when determining whether something is or is not an act of
state.59 In the case of Manuel Noriega, protecting drug cartels and
accepting payoffs for personal profits were clearly not acts of state.
D. Diplomatic Immunity
Noriega next tried to claim immunity as a diplomat. This argu-
ment was easily refuted by the court. The Diplomatic Relations
Act ° and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations61 both re-
quire a country asked to recognize a person as a diplomat officially
accord the person that status. Noriega conceded he did not, by defi-
nition, fit within either of these definitions. However, Noriega relied
on the fact that during previous visits to the United States, the
United States had issued him diplomatic passports and visas.
62
Under traditional notions of international law, this argument failed
because diplomatic passports and visas are issued under the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Services which is wholly independent of
the authority which grants diplomacy to an individual.63
E. The Geneva Convention: Prisoner of War Status
Noriega next invoked the Geneva Convention64 and claimed im-
55. Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1048 (granting the Republic of the Philippines a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
sale of Marcos' New York properties because they were purchases made with "ill-gotten"
wealth).
56. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1523 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
57. Id.
58. Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartage, 757 F.2d 516 (2d
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985) (holding that act of state doctrine did not apply
where foreign government suspended all external debt payments due to foreign government's
financial difficulties).
59. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (holding the act of state
doctrine was applicable even where expropriation violated customary international law);
Hickey, supra note 53, at 747. The importance of using care in judging what constitutes an act
of state by another country is illustrated by the fact that former President Reagan was in-
dicted in Libya for transgressions against Libya's laws. Warren Richey, Noriega Trial to Test
U.S. Constitution; Do Foreign Citizens Have Basic Rights?, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, at A21.
60. Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 254(a)-(e) (1978)).
61. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3229, 500
U.N.T.S. 95.
62. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1524 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF U.S. § 464, reporter's note
1.
64. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Conven-
[Vol. 11:2
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munity as a prisoner of war. Numerous sections of the Geneva Con-
vention were challenged and all failed in turn. The district court did
not decide the issue of whether or not Noriega was truly a prisoner
of war, but assumed, for the sake of argument, he was and pro-
ceeded to defeat all of his claims.6 5
The first section of the Geneva Convention challenged by
Noriega was Article 82. Article 82 provides in pertinent part, "A
prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in
force in the armed forces of the Detaining Power; the Detaining
Power shall be justified in taking judicial or disciplinary measures in
respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such
laws. . ." The court interpreted this section as dealing with viola-
tions committed after the individual became a prisoner of war. Be-
cause Noriega did not violate any laws while in United States cus-
tody, this section was not applicable.
Noriega's challenges to a series of other sections of the Geneva
Convention appeared to be frivolous complaints as the United States
so clearly did not violate these sections. One of these sections was
Article 84 requiring military courts to hear charges brought against
military personnel unless the Detaining Power expressly permits a
civil court to hear the same,67 which the United States does."' Arti-
cle 85 provides for protection under the Convention when a prisoner
of war is prosecuted and convicted under the laws of the Detaining
Power for acts committed prior to capture. 9 Article 85 was chal-
lenged as not allowing for any prosecution at all when, by the very
words of the article, prosecution is allowed. Article 87, allowing
prosecution for crimes only if citizens of the Detaining Power can be
prosecuted for the same, 0 was challenged even though, clearly,
United States citizens can be prosecuted for narcotics trafficking.
Article 99, disallowing mental and/or physical coercion, 7 1 was chal-
lenged when there was no evidence of coerced confessions, no allega-
tion of coerced confessions and Noriega was being afforded the right
to present his defense with the assistance of counsel.
Noriega did make some interesting, if not valid, challenges to
the Geneva Convention. One such challenge was to Article 22 of the
tion 111), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
65. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1525.
66. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Conven-
tion III), supra note 64, at art. 82.
67. Id. at art. 84.
68. District Court Jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1948).
69. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Conven-
tion III), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, at art. 85.
70. Id. at art. 87.
71. Id. at art. 99.
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Convention. 72 This article discusses both the health conditions of the
prisons and the prisoners and the keeping of prisoners of war of the
same nationality together in one location.73 Noriega claimed this ar-
ticle divested the district court of jurisdiction by requiring his release
to Panama, where he should be detained with the other prisoners of
war. Although the Convention mentions both health conditions and
the location of prisoners of war, the court concluded the main pur-
pose was good health conditions of which Noriega was not de-
prived. 74 Therefore, the article in question was not violated. Al-
though the court did not mention it, it is more to the point that
regardless of whether the emphasis of Article 22 lies with health
conditions or with keeping nationals together, the Convention pre-
supposes prisoners of war will be kept within the borders of the De-
taining Power.
Under the Convention, Noriega demanded to be released either
to a third country or to Panama. Article 1271 does allow for release
to a third country, but the Detaining Power has great discretion on
whether or not to release the prisoner and to whom. Such discretion
was exercised in Noriega's case to keep him in the United States
where the courts were certain the Convention would be followed. Ar-
ticle 11876 requires speedy release to the prisoner of war's original
country after hostile activity has occurred. This article would neces-
sarily require Noriega's release to Panama; however, Article 119
permits a Detaining Power to hold a prisoner of war if criminal
charges are pending. 77
Noriega's last attempt at divesting the court of jurisdiction
through the Geneva Convention was using the Red Cross Commen-
tary to the Convention together with the Extradition Treaty Between
United States and Panama. The Red Cross Commentary expresses
the viewpoint that a prisoner of war should not be tried by the De-
72. Id. at art. 22.
73. Id. The full text of Article 22 reads:
Prisoners of war may be interned only in premises located on land and af-
fording every guarantee of hygiene and healthfulness. Except in particular cases
which are justified by the interest of the prisoners themselves, they shall not be
interned in penitentiaries.
Prisoners of war interned in unhealthy areas, or where the climate is injuri-
ous for them, shall be removed as soon as possible to a more favourable climate.
The Detaining Power shall assemble prisoners of war in camps or camp com-
pounds according to their nationality, language and custom, provided that such
prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of war belonging to the armed
forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except with
their consent.
Id.
74. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1527 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
75. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Conven-
tion Iil), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
76. Id. at art. 118.
77. Id. at art. 119.
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taining Power if the individual could not be extradited for the same
offense by his home country. 78 The Extradition Treaty states neither
country is bound to release its own citizens;70 therefore, Noriega
could not have been extradited for the crime charged. Upon examin-
ing the Geneva Convention, it is clear nothing in the Convention lim-
its the court's jurisdiction to extraditable offenses, and the Conven-
tion is more persuasive than the Commentary."0 This Commentary,
however, is the author's view of how the Convention was meant to be
construed, so the court should have afforded it more weight. The
court concluded the offenses committed by Noriega were extradita-
ble under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs to which both
the United States and Panama are parties.
F. Illegal Arrest
Noriega's next attack on the jurisdiction of the United States
was illegal arrest. Illegal arrest, in and of itself, is not enough to
divest a court of jurisdiction because under the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine,
the court does not care how an individual comes before the court.81
Noriega alleged the United States violated the due process rights of
the Panamanians who were killed, injured, or had their property de-
stroyed in the invasion. However, a defendant can claim only per-
sonal due process rights, not those of third parties.8 "
Noriega went on to claim the invasion of Panama, which led to
his arrest, was in violation of the United Nations Charter,83 the Or-
ganization of American States Charter, 4 the Hague Convention, 5
the Geneva Convention, 6 and the Nuremberg Charter. 7 Individuals
cannot assert violations of treaties when the offended government
78. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1528.
79. Extradition Treaty Between United States and Panama, May 25, 1904, U.S.-Pan.,
34 Stat. 2851; Mark Andrew Sherman, Comment, An Inquiry Regarding the International
and Domestic Legal Problems Presented in United States v. Noriega, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 393 (1989).
80. Extradition Treaty Between United States and Panama, May 25, 1904, U.S.-Pan.,
34 Stat. 2851; United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1528; Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S.
280 (1911).
81. United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(holding U.S. court had jurisdiction over Jamaicans arrested 35 miles from Florida and 11.9
miles from a Bahamian island).
82. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (holding supervisory power of the
court cannot be used to suppress the fruits of an illegal search where the search revealed
information about defendant's bank account in a foreign country).
83. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4.
84. " Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 4.
85. Hague Convention, arts. 23(b) and 25, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 658 U.N.T.S.
163.
86. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Conven-
tion Ii), supra note 64.
87. Nuremberg Charter, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 81 U.N.T.S. 279.
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does not.88 Because Panama did not intervene on behalf of Noriega,
Noriega had to prove the treaties under which he claimed protection
provided rights to individuals and the treaty, if violated, limited the
court's jurisdiction.
The United Nations Charter, the Organization of American
States Charter, and the Hague Convention were immediately elimi-
nated because they do not confer rights on individuals.89 The court
found the Geneva Convention was not violated because it deals with
internal armed conflicts, not armed conflicts between nations.90 The
Nuremberg Charter was created in the wake of World War II in
order to prosecute war crimes. 91 The Charter has been applied to
other situations, but the court failed to reach the merits of Noriega's
claimed violations because the Charter does not limit the court's ju-
risdiction when it is violated.9 2 Therefore, violations of the Nurem-
berg Charter would be dismissed under the Ker-Frisbie Doctrine. 93
G. Relief Through the Court's Supervisory Powers
Noriega made a final broad challenge to the executive's admin-
istration of foreign policy and the declaration of war. Executive con-
duct in this capacity is nonjudiciable. 9' Noriega, however, asked the
court to find the armed conflict shocking to the conscience under the
court's supervisory powers. The court still held a definite need for
separation of powers in this political area exists, and refused to use
its supervisory powers. 95
H. Issues the Court Failed to Address
The Panama Canal Treaties are an issue the district court failed
to address.98 Upholding the treaties was a goal of President Bush
when he ordered American troops into Panama.97 The court failed to
address the fact that the treaties demand permanent neutrality in
the Panama Canal, and thereby, conveniently avoided any complica-
tions with the United States retaining jurisdiction over Noriega.
88. United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958
(1983) (upholding convictions for conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana where Maine
state police and DEA agents raided a secluded cove on the Maine coast and obtained disputed
evidence).
89. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
90. Id. at 1534.
91. Id. at 1535.
92. Id.
93. See United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir. 1975).
94. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that the judiciary cannot en-
tertain private litigation which challenges the executive order sending armed forces into an-
other country).
95. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
96. See supra note 19.
97. See supra note 20.
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When Noriega asked the court to invoke its supervisory powers
to declare the invasion of Panama shocking to the conscience, the
court could have considered the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).98 FSIA grants civil courts original jurisdiction over civil
suits regarding both claims to which a foreign state is a party and to
which the foreign state is entitled to immunity. FSIA was intended
to detract from the executive power and to have courts make uni-
form decisions of law. Although FSIA applies only to civil suits, it
may have been possible for the Noriega court to parallel the intent
of FSIA to a criminal suit in order to show the need.for uniform
decisions of law and decreased executive power.
The district court failed to address the Money Laundering Con-
trol Act.99 Noriega had used this act in his first hearing before the
district court' 00 to show the intent of Congress to limit extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction. Noriega argued that because the Money Launder-
ing Control Act was limited to conduct by a United States citizen or,
regarding a noncitizen, to conduct that partly occurred in the United
States, Congress required him to commit some overt act in the
United States before jurisdiction could attach. Although the court
need not address issues not brought before it, the court would have
lent support to its conclusion of extraterritorial jurisdiction if it had
distinguished this incongruity.
The district court seemed determined to obtain jurisdiction over
Noriega. 10 Although many of the arguments raised by Noriega were
not capable of divesting the court of jurisdiction, the court distin-
guished other arguments on very fine lines by stressing the separa-
tion of powers and not questioning the executive's decisions. Al-
though the separation of powers doctrine must be given strong
recognition by the court, it is equally important to ensure the govern-
ment does not overstep its boundaries by violating treaties and tradi-
tional notions of international law by violating a foreigner's rights.
IV. Cable News Network
"Free speech and fair trials are two of the most cherished poli-
98. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4),
1391(f), 1441(d), and 1602-1611 (1982).
99. Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1988).
100. United States v. Noriega, 683 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
101. The court's determination to keep jurisdiction of Noriega was displayed by the
court barring nearly all evidence presented by Noriega's attorneys attempting to show
Noriega's help with the Central Intelligence Agency; the court ruled such evidence was irrele-
vant. Rohter, supra note 5; see also, Cable News Network, Inc.: U.S. Attorneys Who Tried
Noriega Case Discuss Verdict (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 9, 1992). At the close of the
trial, the district court judge, the Honorable Judge Hoeveler, received accolades from both the
prosecution and the defense for his handling of this case. Larry King Live: Manuel Noriega:
Guilty on Eight Counts (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 9, 1992). The prosecution went so
far as to compare Judge Hoeveler with Abraham Lincoln. Id.
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cies of our civilization, and it would be a trying task to choose be-
tween them."' 2 The district court's decision of jurisdiction was jeop-
ardized when Noriega filed a motion to dismiss' 0 3 based on the
government's taping of his phone conversations with his attorney.
Noriega was claiming deprivation of the right to a fair trial, while
CNN was claiming its right to free speech and freedom of the press.
After Noriega was captured in Panama, he was flown to the
United States and incarcerated in the Metropolitan Correctional
Center in Dade County, Florida.""4 Telephone calls from this prison
facility are routinely monitored for security reasons unless the calls
are made to an inmate's attorney and the guards are so informed.' 0 5
Noriega was informed of this rule orally; in addition, stickers are
attached to every telephone reiterating the rule.10 6 However, telling
the guard the telephone call is to be placed to an attorney is not
enough; the inmate must also request the call be "unmonitored" or
"privileged", and use those exact words.10 7 Noriega did inform the
guards the calls were to be made to his attorney, but he never used
the words "unmonitored" or "privileged". The prison officials claim
this specific rule was explained to him orally by a translator.10 8
Knowing the prison officials kept phone logs and taped record-
ings of calls made to locations outside the prison, the government
subpoenaed the logs and the tapes. 0 9 These tapes were to be
screened by an outside Drug Enforcement Agency official to ensure
no attorney-client conversations were on the tapes; however, the ma-
jority of the tapes were not screened before the government listened
to them." 0
Cable News Network (CNN) received seven of the government
tapes from an undisclosed source."' On November 6, 1990, CNN
played the tapes to Noriega's attorney, Frank A. Rubino, who recog-
nized that some of the tapes revealed conversations between Noriega
and different members of his defense team." 2 Rubino initially de-
cided the tapes could be aired on CNN; however, by the next morn-
ing, November 7, 1990, Rubino had filed an emergency petition to
102. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941) (holding that author, publisher and
editor could not be held in contempt for publications of editorials commenting negatively about
a court decision).
103. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
104. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1046 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
105. Id. at 1047.
106. Id. All stickers were printed in English and Spanish. Id.
107. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
108. Id. at 1486.
109. Id. at 1483; see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
110. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1991). See supra note 25 and accom-
panying text.
111. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1990).
112. Id.; United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045, 1046 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
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enjoin the broadcast of any attorney-client conversations."'
A. Prior Restraint: The District Court's Decision
The southern florida district court held an emergency hearing
on November 8, 1990, to decide Noriega's request for a temporary
restraining order (TRO)." 4 The court awarded Noriega's TRO, and
ordered CNN not to air the tapes until the court listened to them."15
CNN was asked to give the tapes to the court, but CNN refused,
telling the court to obtain the tapes from the government." 6 CNN
filed an emergency appeal from the district court's TRO, and at the
same time, violated the district court's order by airing the tapes,
which allowed millions of viewers to hear the tapes before the court
could hear the tapes. Although the court tried to get the tapes inde-
pendently, it was too difficult because it was impossible for the court
to know which seven tapes CNN had acquired. 17
CNN believed the decision would be overturned because strong
precedent existed in favor of the press in prior restraint cases." 8
Normally, the press does not need to persuade judges to allow them
to print stories because any harm occurring as a result of a story is
dealt with after it is printed." 9 Although some of these previous
prior restraint cases concerned publications about criminal proceed-
ings and the effect they might have on a fair trial, none of the cases
addressed the publication of attorney-client conversations. This was
an issue of first impression in front of a court already trying to eval-
uate the sensitive issue of jurisdiction over an infamous international
113. Marcia Chambers, CNN Takes Wrong Tack In Tape Row, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 10,
1990, at 13. News articles opined that because of the excessive negative publicity regarding
Noriega before he arrived in America and during his trial, nothing CNN aired could possibly
hurt his reputation any further; therefore, Noriega could not have been deprived of a fair trial
by CNN airing the taped conversations. For example, President Bush had publicly labelled
Noriega as a "narco-terrorist." O'Brien, supra note 32; Anthony Lewis, CNN's Reckless
Noriega-Tapes Caper, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 26, 1990, at 6.
114. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
115. Id. at 1034-35.
116. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990); Chambers, supra note
113. CNN has had two employees subpoenaed in connection with a grand jury investigation
into CNN's airing of Noriega's taped conversations. Grand Jury Investigating CNN's Noriega
Story, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1993, at A2.
117. Chambers, supra note 113.
118. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding that the right to counsel
was violated when the government bugged an informant's car and listened to the informant
elicit incriminating information from the plaintiff knowing that plaintiff was represented by
counsel); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (upholding a prior
restraint for national security reasons on an emergency appeal by the New York Times asking
to be allowed to publish the Pentagon Papers.); In re King World Productions, Inc., 898 F.2d
56 (6th Cir. 1990) (disallowing prior restraint of a videotape taken in violation of antitrust and
wiretap laws); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (allowing a newspaper to publish
stories of neglect of duty and corruption by law enforcement officers without proving the statu-
tory requirements of truth, good motives and justifiable ends and limiting plaintiff's cause of
action to libel).
119. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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figure.
In Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,'" the Supreme Court
created a three prong test that the party asking for a prior restraint
must pass before it will be issued. The party asking for a prior re-
straint must first show the individual's right to a fair trial would be
impaired by the publication. Next, the party must overcome the bur-
den of proving no less restrictive means than prior restraint would be
sufficient to protect the individual's right to a fair trial. Finally, the
individual must show the prior restraint would effectively prevent the
harm publication would produce.'
CNN did not believe this test could be met by Noriega at the
trial court level and was shocked when the court issued the TRO
enjoining CNN from airing the tapes until the court heard them.
CNN believed the order was unconstitutional 22 and immediately
filed an emergency appeal.123 CNN's attorney advised the network
they would win on appeal; and, therefore, violation of the order
would not result in a contempt violation. 24
B. Prior Restraint: Upheld on Appeal
CNN raised many valid issues on appeal to the Eleventh Cir-
cuit. The first argument was the tape recorded conversations were
not privileged attorney-client conversations for two reasons. The first
reason was Noriega failed to follow the proper procedure to make
the conversations privileged. 2 5 Some other press associations were
outspoken in their disagreement with CNN on this issue. Those as-
sociations in disagreement stated the press is usually the first to re-
spect confidentiality in any context because the press must rely on it
so often. 26 Generally, those associations in disagreement were an-
gered by CNN's conduct because it was an invitation to bring bad
law into First Amendment issues.'27
The second reason argued by CNN was that Noriega did not
120. Id. at 556-558. Nebraska Press Assn. dealt with a man on trial for multiple
murders committed in a small town. A lower court used prior restraint to stop the press from
publishing the defendant's original confession to police and others. While recognizing freedom
of expression is not absolute, the United States Supreme Court revoked the prior restraint
stating the barriers to prior restraint are high and the presumption against its use remains
intact. Id.
121. Id. at 562.
122. Catherine Wilson, Judge Enjoins CNN After Noriega-lawyer Calls Televised, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 8, 1990, at 1.
123. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (1lth Cir. 1990).
124. Lewis, supra note 113. CNN's attorney should have known from precedent that a
contempt order can be issued where a lower court's order has been violated, even if the lower
court's order is overturned on appeal. Id.
125. Martha Ann Overland, Prior Restraint Upheld, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 19.
126. See Chambers, supra note 113.
127. Id.
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meet the test set forth in United States v. Melvin.12 To invoke the
attorney-client privilege under the Melvin test, the client must intend
the conveyed information to remain confidential and have a reasona-
ble expectation the conveyed information will remain confidential.1 29
CNN believed since Noriega knew his conversations were taped un-
less the proper procedure was followed, he had no reasonable expec-
tation the conversations would remain confidential.
If the court did find an attorney-client privilege, CNN argued
airing the tapes caused no additional harm to Noriega because the
government's taping of his conversations with his attorney was the
constitutional violation, not the airing of the recorded conversa-
tions."'a CNN felt it could win on this issue because Noriega ini-
tially asked for the prior restraint so that his right to the attorney-
client privilege would not be violated further. 1 Noriega's interest in
the right to a fair trial did not become an issue until later.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit characterized the
battle as a Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial versus a First
Amendment right to freedom of the press.132 The appellate court ap-
plied a lower standard than the three prong Nebraska test by fash-
ioning the appeal as an "access" case.13 3 The court of appeals rea-
soned that because the general public had no right to know the
privileged communication between Noriega and his defense team,
and because the media is entitled to no more information than the
public, the prior restraint issued by the district court was proper."3
Through this reasoning, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the TRO and stated its anger in regard
to CNN's violation of the district court's TRO.1 38  CNN and
Noriega compromised that CNN would not air the tapes until the
Supreme Court had decided the issue as long as Noriega did not
bring contempt charges for violation of the district court's order.
13 6
128. 650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (holding no violation of attorney-client privi-
lege occurred where Drug Enforcement Agency sent a defendant, turned informer, to meetings
involving other defendants in the same case and their attorneys). CNN also argued that prior
restraints should only issue if the airing of the tapes would render it impossible to select an
unbiased jury. CNN Noriega Tapes Gag Order Stands, NEWS MEDIA & THE L., Wntr. 1991,
at 6.
129. United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
130. Richard Carelli, CNN Asks Justice to Set Aside Ban on Noriega Tapes, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 19, 1990, at 1.
131. Id.
132. Richard Cole, CNN, Noriega Lawyers Compromise, CI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov.
12, 1990, at 1.
133. Floyd Abrams, et al., No. The Wrong Standard Was Applied, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991,
at 37.
134. Id.
135. United States v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (l1th Cir. 1990).
136. Cole, supra note 123.
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The district court approved this plan.137
C. Prior Restraint: Allowed by the Supreme Court
CNN, disagreeing with the eleventh circuit, immediately took
an emergency appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.
CNN argued that reporting government misconduct must be given
more weight because the issue was a public event.138 CNN further
argued the presumptive unconstitutionality of prior restraints and
the clear and unequivocal showing that must be accomplished in or-
der to meet the demands of the three prong test espoused by Ne-
braska Press Assn. v. Stuart."s9 CNN rightfully asserted the court
could not meet this test without having first heard the tapes. Because
they had not, CNN argued the issuance of a prior restraint was
erroneous.
In turn, the government argued in favor of the prior restraint
and upholding the issuance of the injunction. The government
pointed out the prior restraint successfully met the goal of a prelimi-
nary injunction, maintaining the status quo until the issue is heard
on the merits.140 The' government argued the Nebraska test could
not be applied until the court had an adequate record of the tapes;
therefore, maintaining the status quo was the most equitable result
the court could reach. 4" Taking the scenario one step further, the
government emphasized if the tapes were aired, the whole case
would be moot as the harm would have occurred already. 4 2
On November 15, 1990, the Supreme Court upheld the prior
restraint with virtually no justification and with a vehement dissent
by Justices Marshall and O'Conner.' 4' The dissenters believed the
lower court did not address the three prong test for prior restraint
enunciated in Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart.4 4 One theory of why
the Supreme Court's majority opinion lacked any reasoning was
CNN had filed an emergency appeal, and the Supreme Court was
waiting to hear the case on the merits, as they did in the Pentagon
Papers Case.1 45 This interpretation is easily distinguished from the
CNN case because in the Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme Court
137. Id.
138. Abrams, et al., supra note 133.
139. Id.; Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). See supra, note 120 and
accompanying text."
140. Kenneth Starr, et al., Yes: The Order Was Constitutional, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at
36.
141. Id.
142. Id. CNN had argued that the case was already moot because the tapes had been
aired; therefore, any harm that could have been done was complete. See Abrams, et al., supra
note 124.
143. Cable News Network, Inc. v. Noriega, - U.S. -. , 11l S. Ct. 451 (1990).
144. Id.
145. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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upheld the prior restraint because they were concerned about na-
tional security.' 6 Here, although Noriega was an international fig-
ure, there was no concern about national security.
D. Outside Influences on the Courts
The Noriega court may have been faced with other pressures.
The Bush administration opposed both CNN's airing of the tapes
and CNN's request to overturn the TRO issued by the district
court."" Although the court is not to be influenced by political pres-
sure, the court gives substantial deference to the President and his
staff in matters dealing with international figures. Therefore, it is
possible all levels of the court could have been influenced by the
Bush administration's view. As appellant in the action, the United
States did not want the tapes aired for fear if they were, the tapes
may have been found to jeopardize Noriega's right to a fair trial. If
the government had been denied an opportunity to proceed in its
case against Noriega at this point based on CNN's violation of
Noriega's fair trial rights, the government would have sustained a
devastating blow by wasting a tremendous amount of resources on
both the invasion of Panama and the subsequent research and man-
power to prepare for trial. 48
E. The Effect of the Tapes' Release on Noriega's Right to a Fair
Trial
CNN was forced to relinquish the tapes to the court for deter-
mination of whether or not they should be aired.'49 After the resis-
tance by CNN to release the tapes to the court, upon listening to
them, the court found the tapes were harmless because most of the
language was coded.' 50
The tapes became public record because they were officially
transcribed into the court record; therefore, they were available to
any news agency.' 5 ' Various newspapers reported specific quotes
from the tapes revealing the coded language and speculating about
146. Id.
147. James H. Rubin, CNN-Noriega Tapes Ruling Harms Press Freedom, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Nov. 19, 1990, at 1.
148. Overland, supra note 125.
149. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Because CNN had
previously violated the court's temporary restraining order, they tried to disqualify the district
court judge in the determination of whether or not the tapes should be aired. The judge was
not disqualified.
150. United States v. Noriega, 752 F. Supp. 1045 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
151. Id. CNN initially protested the tapes becoming available to all news agencies,
claiming that it had exclusive rights to the tapes because of its proprietary interest. Id. Since
the tapes were a matter of public record, anyone could access them. Id.
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the true meaning.152 In this respect the tapes could have violated
Noriega's right to a fair trial. The assumptions being made public as
to the code were derogatory in nature as the press tried to show
through the coded language that Noriega was shifting his assets to
protect himself and to stop the government from proceeding with a
lawful discovery. 153
Noriega filed a motion to dismiss based on the government's
wrongful interception of his telephone calls with his defense team.'54
This action was not successful because Noriega failed to prove the
requisite prejudice necessary to show a Sixth Amendment violation.
Intrusions into the attorney-client relationship are not per se uncon-
stitutional; therefore, Noriega needed to show either injury to him-
self or a benefit to the state.1 55 Neither of these items were proven.
A dismissal for improper conduct after a valid indictment has
152. Mike Clary, Transcript of Noriega Tapes is Released, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1990, at
A12.
The following accounts were quoted in a conversation between Noriega and a woman
identified as Norma, the mother of Noriega's mistress, Vicki Amado:
Norma: Little Soldier, . . . at any given moment there we have . . . a good
towel.
Noriega: Ah, perfect.
Norma: And the important thing is that it shouldn't be a hand towel.
Id. Noriega Transcript Is Made Public, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1990, at A26.
The following conversation was quoted between Norma and Noriega:
Noriega: Hasn't the man arrived?
Norma: No, but I have something to discuss with you.
Noriega: Uh-huh
Norma: Do you recall trying to send him a message today?
Noriega: Yes.
Norma: Yes, about the small one?
Noriega: Yes, yes, yes.
Norma: He gave me a number.
Noriega: Hmm.
Id. Noriega Tapes: Reading Between the Lines, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 1990, at 3A.
A conversation between Noriega and Norma went as follows:
Norma: No, I ended up without lunch because ...
Noriega: Yes, yes, yes.
Norma: Too cold . . . a hassle.
Noriega: Ah, uh-huh, the weather there is bad?
Norma: Yes, yes, yes.
Id. Noriega Transcripts Released Ending CNN Court Clash, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1990, § 1,
at A4.
The Washington Post included a conversation between Noriega and his attorneys, Fernan-
dez, as well as between Noriega and Norma:
Noriega: Okay, listen, did you talk to Lazarillo?
Fernandez: Yes, we had breakfast real early this morning.
Noriega: Ah, good.
Fernandez: Everything, everything's super good with him. I gave him your ...
thing . . . the message, a little confusing. You'll have to explain it better, later
because Leon gave me a very nebulous explanation.
Noriega: Well, it's that the thing hasn't arrived, see?
Id.
153. See generally supra note 143.
154. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
155. Id. at 1489.
UNITED STATES V. NORIEGA
been issued is rare."' Noriega would normally be limited to a civil
action for damages where the violation consists solely of improper
disclosure of otherwise legally intercepted communications. 5 , The
legality of the government's interception of Noriega's taped conver-
sations was questionable because the government asked for the tapes
pursuant to subpoenas duces tecum, commanding the custodian of
records at the prison to appear and testify in the courtroom on spe-
cific hearing dates when no such hearings were ever scheduled. 58 In
fact, no testimony was ever given; the government received only the
actual tape recordings. Usually, when improper conduct occurs, a
contempt citation is issued, or the party benefited will not be allowed
to use any of the information gained from the illegal conduct. 159
Here, the only consequence to the government was the court admon-
ished them for failing to disclose the contents of the tapes to the
defense pursuant to statute."1 0
Noriega also failed to show he met the necessary test of United
States v. Melvin. 6' Noriega was required to prove the attorney-cli-
ent conversations were intended to be confidential and he had a rea-
sonable expectation the conversations would remain confidential. Al-
though Noriega met the first prong of the test, the court found he
did not have a reasonable expectation his conversations would re-
main confidential.' The fact that Noriega spoke in coded language
could have been determinative on this issue. The court also found
Noriega did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment because he knew conversations were routinely
taped. 63 This decision was advantageous for the United States as
they maintained their ability to try Noriega for drug charges.
Noriega could have, and possibly should have, been released
from United States custody to stand trial in Panama. Noriega was
and still is wanted in Panama on charges of stealing public funds,
torturing prisoners, and aiding drug dealers.6 4 Although the United
States has a vested interest in keeping the United States drug free,
156. Id. at 1489-90.
157. 18 U.S.C. § 2520; see infra, note 159.
158. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991). See supra, note 25
and accompanying text.
159. Charley Roberts, Tapes Imperil Drug Charges Against Noriega, L.A. DAILY J.,
Nov. 9, 1990, at 1. Lawyers were predicting that the court would look either to Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977), for the proposition that a violation of defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment rights do not require a showing of prejudice, or to Corillo v. Cinelly, 485 U.S. 1037
(1988), which held that the government's acquisition of defense tapes was prima facie evidence
of prejudice. The court was unaffected by either of these holdings.
160. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1494 (S.D. Fla. 1991); F. R. Crim.P.
16(a)(1)(A).
161. United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981).
162. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
163. Id.
164. Mike Williams, Noriega Prosecution Mired, L.A. DAILY J., Dec. 25, 1990, at 1.
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and Noriega interfered with and violated that interest, Noriega's vio-
lations against Panama and its people surpass any interest of the
United States government.
The tapes acquired by CNN were also in the hands of Panama-
nian officials.165 Panamanian courts would have been able to deci-
pher Noriega's code with more ease than any American court since
Panama's courts would have had jurisdiction over the people to
whom Noriega spoke in Panama. It does not seem to be proper for
the United States to invade a country, capture one of the heads of
their military, and bring such a leader back to the United States to
face charges which are secondary to the interests of the originating
country. The United States, however, did exactly that.
Noriega's trial caused controversy for all the above reasons,'and
many more. The prosecution needed twenty-seven months to prepare
for Noriega's trial. 16  During the first three months of the trial, the
prosecution presented forty-six witnesses, granting some type of im-
munity or lenient treatment to twenty of the testifying drug deal-
ers.167 The transcript of the trial is over 17,000 pages long with more
than 700 exhibits. 168 After the seven month trial ended, the jury6 9
began deliberating. A deadlock ensued, but a guilty verdict was
handed to the judge on April 9, 1992.170
Although the jurors were told to overlook all political aspects of
the case,' 7 ' the international community cannot be expected to ig-
nore the politics of this case. President George Bush was quoted as
calling the guilty verdict "a major victory against the drug lords."' 72
But, at what cost is this a victory for the United States? The cost of
the trial to the United States has been estimated at $20 million dol-
lars, not including the $160 million dollars it is estimated was spent
on the invasion of Panama to bring Noriega to the United States. 173
It appears the fears of Noriega's attorney, Rubino, might prop-
erly summarize the cost of this trial to the international community.
Mr. Rubino stated, "The United States will now trample across the
entire world, imposing its will upon so-called independent, sovereign
nations. Unless leaders of foreign governments are willing to kneel
165. Cole, supra note 13.
166. Cable News Network, Inc.: U.S. Attorneys Who Tried Noriega Case Discuss Ver-
dict (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 9, 1992).
167. Rohter, supra note 5.
168. The MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour: Guilty (PBS television broadcast, Apr. 9, 1992).
169. The jury consisted of nine women and three men, Rohter, Rohter, supra, note 5,
comprised of nine blacks, two whites, and one hispanic, Key Events in Noriega Drug Case,
REUTERS, Apr. 9, 1992, available in LEXIs, Nexis Library, Omni File.
170. Rohter, supra note 5.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See supra note 166. One prosecutor disagreed with the twenty million dollar esti-
mate and made his own estimate of approximately one million dollars. Supra.
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once a day and face Washington and give grace to George Bush,
they, too, may be in the same posture as General Noriega. '"174
Noriega, himself, spoke to the judge for nearly three hours at his
sentencing where Noriega accused President Bush, ". . . of using his
power and authority to influence and subvert the criminal justice
system of the United States to condemn me." 17 5
The reaction to the guilty verdict in Panama was described as
low-key. 176  President Endara of Panama stated he would allow
United States justice stand if there was no leniency in Noriega's sen-
tencing.177 The prosecutor in Panama said Noriega would be tried in
absentia by a Panamanian court on thirty charges ranging from
human rights violations to corruption and murder.1 78 The interna-
tional community should be concerned that the military head of a
sovereign country is tried in-absentia there while the United States
has satisfied its own needs without regard to the leader's homeland's
rights.
The reaction to Noriega's'sentencing was met with more enthu-
siasm than his guilty verdict by some in Panama. Many honked
horns and banged pots in the streets.1 79 Others expressed the view
that it would have been better if Panama had delivered the sentence,
stating, "Noriega is above all a Panamanian and should be judged in
his own country."' 80 Panamanian leaders have decided to let this
sentence stand, rather than risking the political tumult of attempting
to bring Noriega back to Panama for another trial; 8 ' however, the
international community must regret Panama is forced to make. a
choice at all. Panama should not be compelled to seek permission
from the Untied States to try a citizen and leader of their own coun-
174. Rohter, supra note 5. In support of Mr. Rubino's contention, it has been rumored
that United States prosecutors were giving serious consideration to trying to indict Cuban
leader Fidel Castro on drug-trafficking charges. Miami TV Station Says Castor Could Face
Indictment, REUTERS, Aug. 20, 1992, available in LEXIs, Nexis Library, Omni File.
175. Noriega Sentence to 40 Years in Prison; Former General Assails Bush, supra note
6. During his statement, Noriega quoted a wide range of sources, including the Bible, Socra-
tes, Chinese philosophy and Hillary Rodham Clinton. Id. The judge replied to his long speech
by stating that Noriega failed to understand that politics were not a part of the United States
criminal justice system. Id.
176. Cable News Network, Inc.: Panamanians Rejoice After Noriega Verdicts (CNN
television broadcast, Apr. 9, 1992).
177. Id.
178. Political Leaders Welcome Noriega Guilty Verdict, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr.
9, 1992, available in LExis, Nexis Library, Omni file.
179. Noriega's Sentence Cheered; 40-Year Term Spurs Panama City Street Party,
STAR TRIB., Jul. 12, 1992, at Al. Noriega's sentence was handed down on the same date as
what has become known as Black Friday in Panama. Id. The date is known as Black Friday
because on the same date in 1987, thousands of Noriega opponents took to the streets to
demand the strongman's ousting. Id. This protest brought about a strong military crackdown
in which hundreds were injured and arrested. Id.
180. Panama: Noriega Sentence Closes "Painful" Chapter in History, INTER PRESS
SERV., Jul. 10, 1992, available in LEXiS, Nexis library, Omni file.
181. Rohter, supra note 5.
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try which the United States forcibly removed. 182
V. Conclusion
"It is not at all clear that General Noriega's arrival in Florida is
an example of compliance by the United States with the tapestry of
international norms that are supposed to 'regulate' behavior in the
international community. ' 183  Noriega raised a myriad of issues to
try to divest the district court of jurisdiction, and the court consist-
ently found in favor of the United States in order to keep Noriega
within the court's power. The rulings made-in favor of jurisdiction
were most likely because of the deference afforded to the President
of the United States and his administration in the area of foreign
affairs.
Because the court pays deference to the executive in areas con-
cerning foreign policy and international figures, the assistance of for-
eign policy advisors might be considered helpful at an early stage of
the proceedings, even as early as prior to indictment. However, using
foreign policy advisors could also be troublesome because the advi-
sors could inject too many politics into what is considered a tradi-
tionally unpolitical forum. 84 The foreign policy advisors would most
likely be tempted to negotiate deals with other countries by using the
criminal courts as a threat. These back channel deals would inject an
unnecessary problem into an already imperfect system.
An international criminal forum would be the best solution to
this problem. This type of court could not be guilty of the hidden
prejudice of protecting its own resources, its own people and its own
government. Currently, no effective enforcement system is in place
at the international level.' 85 The need for a national legal system and
for the establishment of a permanent international criminal court
have been discussed by scholars from various countries, 86 and such
182. Panama's Supreme Court has postponed the murder trial of Dr. Hugo Spadafora to
permit testimony from Noriega, one of the fifteen defendants in the case. Panama Asks Wash-
ington's O.K. to Question Noriega, NOTIMEX MEX. NEws SERV., Sept. 23, 1992, available in
LEXis, Nexis Library, Current file; Panama Delays Murder Trial So Noriega Can Testify,
REUTERS, Sept. 22, 1992, available in LExis, Nexis Library, Omni File. The court has asked
the United States State Department to arrange a meeting with Noriega, his lawyers and a
Panamanian diplomat to elicit Noriega's statement. Id. Noriega has agreed to testify in any
Panamanian court case on the condition the proceedings are conducted within Panama. Id.
183. John T. Philipsborn, Try Noriega in an International Court?, L.A. DAILY J., Feb.
15, 1990, at 6.
184. Joel Cohen, Negotiating Criminal Cases - A Role for Foreign-Policy Advisors?,
N.Y. L.J., Jul. 14, 1988, at 1.
185. Philipsborn, supra note 183; Harvey, supra note 14. There has been a call for inter-
national military action in cases similar to Noriega: "There could come a time when the
United Nations should not only. be prepared to authorize joint international action to assist
countries under siege from drug traffickers, but also, where necessary, to dislodge governments
that are their pawns." Harvey, supra note 14.
186. Philipsborn, supra note 183. Among the scholars who supported this idea at a collo-
quium in Tunis in 1987 were the national reporters for Brazil, the German Democratic Repub-
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courts may come to pass in the near future because of the direction
the law is moving regarding international crime."' 7 However, effectu-
ating an acceptable international criminal law may be difficult be-
cause of the differing values placed on various offenses by different
countries.
International crimes are broadly defined as crimes against
peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.188 Since the World
War II Nuremberg and the Tokyo tribunals, -no major effort has
been exerted to organize similar criminal courts. As the Noriega
case shows, the time to do so is now.189
Susan B.V. Ellington
lic, Tunisia, and the Soviet Union. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. There is a desire to expand this definition to include preparing for an aggressive
act against another nation, the use of nuclear weapons and apartheid. Id.
189. Larry Rohter, Former Smuggler Ties Top Officials of Cuba and Nicaragua to
Drug Ring, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991, § A, at 20. Carlos Lehder Rivas, a founding member
of the Medellin drug cartel, testified in the Noriega trial on November 20 and 21, 1991. Rivas'
testimony implicated General Raul Castro, Cuba's Minister of Defense, and certain Sandinista
officials. Id. As Rivas' testimony shows, the international character of the Noriega trial cannot
be ignored. These allegations could best be dealt with in an international criminal court.
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